For sometime now, we have been
looking at giving the up and coming generation the attention that they
deserve. Our aim is to make available to them the sort of things and
literature that they identify with and like in different languages, amongst
which is English. It is an undeniable fact that English has become the
primary language of communication between our second generations living here
in the West. Accordingly, the Alul Bayt (a.s.)
Foundation for Reviving the Heritage, London, U.K. has recognised the need
for setting up a publishing house whose duty it is to translate the gems of
our religious and cultural heritage to the main living languages. After
discussing the idea with Hujjatul Islam as-Sayyid Jawad ash-Shahristani, the
establishment of Dar Al-Hadi in London, U.K. has become a reality.
It is a known fact that many
members of our younger generation aspire to become acquainted with and/or
study the different disciplines taught in the conventional centres of
religious learning and scholarship. And yet, it has been difficult for them
to materialise this aim because of the complexity of the subject matter.
However, we have been lucky
enough to come across a series of books intended to untangle these often
highly complex fields and make them readily discernable by the layman. The
author, Martyr Murtadha Mutahhari, who is among the luminaries of our school
of thought, has been known for his original thought and vast contribution to
the Islamic library. This series has been chosen to
inaugurate a project that we hope will grow to satisfy a pressing need for
familiarisation with such complex material, which our younger generation
have heard of but yet to understand its content and objectives. Introducing these generations
to Islamic sciences in this style, which aims to unravel the vague and make
meaningful the ambiguous, is our main goal. In the end, we pray to the
Almighty to make this effort of ours beneficial to those who aspire to gain
this type of knowledge, and bestow success on us to produce these booklets.
Our aim and hopes are to gain happiness in this world and the hereafter. And
Allah is the best friend and helper. Fadhil Bahrululum It is not strange to raise the
question of how can one make simpler a complex subject such as the science
of kalaam or (scholastic theology)? This is what we have set out to do. In
this booklet we have attempted to make the subject accessible as well as
seeking to be as concise as possible. This booklet is not only
introduces the science of kalaam to the reader but However, the final say is that
of the reader. Fadhil Bahrul Uloom Lesson one The science of scholastic, or
speculative, theology (kalaam) is an Islamic science. It is
concerned with discussing Islamic beliefs, or what should be upheld of such
beliefs from an Islamic perspective. Thus, kalaam seeks to explain
the matters relating to these beliefs, advancing the evidence in support
thereof and defending the same. Muslim scholars divide the body
of Islamic teachings into three categories: 1. Beliefs:
This category deals with the questions and knowledge that one has to be
familiar with and subsequently believe in, such as monotheism, the
Attributes of the Creator, universal and exclusive prophethood, etc.
However, Islamic schools of thought differed as to what constitutes the
fundamentals of religion and thereby have to be espoused as such. 2. Ethics: This
category deals with the issues and teachings that discuss the “status of
man”, i.e. those questions relating to moral qualities and spiritual
characteristics, such as fairness, piety, courage, integrity, wisdom,
rectitude, truthfulness, trustworthiness, etc. 3. Laws: This
category takes care of matters relating to the performance and mechanics of
acts of worship, such as prayer, fast, hajj (pilgrimage), jihad,
enjoining good and forbidding evil, sale and hire, marriage, divorce,
inheritance, etc. This category is known by another title, namely,
jurisprudence. According to such a division,
Islamic teachings have become the main thrust of Islam, to the exclusion of
Islamic sciences that discuss the preliminaries, such as humanities, logic,
and to a certain extent philosophy. Also, according to this
dissection, there has been a focus on the relationship between Islamic
teachings and man. That is, matters relating to man’s intellect have been
given the name “beliefs”, whereas the title “ethics” has become synonymous
with questions concerning man’s morals and spiritual welfare. As for the
issues relating to how man goes about conducting his devotions, they have
been given the name “jurisprudence”. As shall, God willing, be
explained, although jurisprudence is considered one science, from a
juridical perspective, yet it consists of a number of sub sciences. However, kalaam
(speculative or scholastic theology) is the science that is concerned with
Islamic beliefs or doctrines. It used to be called “fundamentals of
religion” or “unity and attributes”. The origins of
kalaam It is not possible to determine
with absolute certainty when the science of scholastic theology started.
Yet, the middle of the second Hijri (Islamic lunar calendar) century
witnessed the beginning of the controversy between Muslims over issues of a
kalaam nature. Thus, questions of freewill, predestination, and
justice, were debated. Perhaps, the first official seminary was that of al-Hassan
al-Basri (d. 110 H.). Two towering figures, who lived
in the middle of the second century, come to mind, especially when one talks
about vehement defence of man’s freewill. They are Ma’bad al-Juhni [d.
80/669] and Gheelan ad-Dimashqi [of Damascus, d. 150/767]. On the
other side of the ideological divide, there were the proponents of the
doctrine of predestination. The latter were known as “jabri’ites”, as
opposed to the former, “qadri’ites”, The differences between these
two schools of thought had crept into other issues relating to divinity,
natural and social sciences, man and resurrection. The qadri’ites were
later known by the name, “mu’tazilites” [lit. the separatists, founded by
Wasil bin Ata’ (130/748), the student of al-Hassan al-Basri after he had
turned his back to his teacher] and the jabri’ites [from the Arabic
root jabr (necessity, compulsion)], “ash’ari’ites”, [i.e. named after
the founder of the School, Abul Hassan Ali bin Ismail al-Ash’ari (d.
324/935)]. The orientalists and their
disciples are adamant that the beginning of deductive work in the world of
Islam started with that sort of debate. Nevertheless, the truth is that
deductive research in Islamic fundamentals emanated from the Holy Qur’an.
The prophetic traditions and the sermons of Imam Ali (a.s.) used to provide
the commentary on those Qur’anic passages. It has to be noted, though, that
that scholarship varied in style and substance, pursuant to the calibre of
Muslim speculative theologians (mutakalimeen). Research or following? The Holy Qur’an has secured the
pillars of belief according to reasoning. It has always aimed to make
people reach conviction by way of intellection or rational judgement. The
Holy Book does not consider worship in matters of belief sufficient.
Therefore, fundamentals of religion have to be examined through logic.
Questions such as the existence
of God and His unity should be resolved by way of rational judgement, so as
the prophethood of Mohammad (s.a.w.). This is how the science of the
fundamentals of religion emerged during the first century of the Islamic
era. The embracing of Islam by
non-Arabs, the existence of different ideologies and principles, and the
co-existence of Muslims with the followers of other religions, such as Jews,
Christians, Magians, and Sabians, had precipitated debate between Muslims.
Those developments and the interaction between all those peoples were
instrumental in the appearance of groups, such as atheists, thanks to the
general climate of freedom, especially at the time of the Abbasid
caliphate. The latter did not mind the proliferation of such trends,
provided that holding such views did not constitute any divergence from the
ruling establishment’s general guidelines. Philosophy, which called for
freethinking and the casting of doubt and false arguments, also came to the
fore. All those developments called for scrutiny in the fundamental
structures of Islam, with a view of consolidating them, hence the emergence
of great speculative theologians (mutakalimeen) in the second, third
and fourth centuries of the Islamic era. The early issues Perhaps, among the early
issues, which became the bone of contention between Muslims, was the
question of predestination and freewill. This was quite natural, not least
because it has a bearing on man’s destiny, hence, the importance attached to
it by any sensible person. There might not be a single
intellectually mature society whose members do not engage in debate on these
matters. Moreover, since the Holy Qur’an discussed these issues in many
verses, it has become the driving force behind the dialogue on such
questions between people. Therefore, we should not go far
in order to find a justification for the appearance of this issue in the
world of Islam. As for the orientalists, they always seek to refute the
originality of Islamic sciences and thought, in any way possible, above all,
by tracing such knowledge and scholarship to domains outside the realm of
Islam, especially, Christianity. That is why, they try to attribute the
science of kalaam (speculative theology) to some other ideology, i.e.
not Islamic. After all, this is what they tried to do with even purely
Arabic sciences, such as grammar, metrics, rhetoric, figures of speech, and
Islamic gnosis, or mysticism (Irfan). The research in predestination
and freewill also deals with the question of decree and destiny (qadha
and qadr). Insofar as its relationship with the human beings is
concerned, it is called predestination and freewill (jabr and
ikhtiyar). And as far as its link with God is concerned, it is called
decree and destiny. The research has been extended to cover the issue of
[Divine] Justice (adl) for the obvious correlation between
predestination and injustice, on the one hand, and freewill and justice, on
the other. Justice, however, led to the
study of the “inbuilt good and repugnance” (husn and qubh) of
the human actions; this in turn led to the study of reason (aql) and
intellectual independence. As a result of discussing all
these topics, yet another subject came to the fore, viz. wisdom (hikma),
i.e. the wise intents and purposes of the Divine. The research had
gradually developed to cover other topics, such as the unity of actions (Tawheed
afa’ali) and the unity of attributes (Tawheed sifati).
This will be discussed later on. These scholastic theology
issues and research had branched out into a plethora of subjects that have a
philosophical dimension, such as the studies in the essence and
manifestations of things and the composition of the body from inseparable
parts. Scholastic theologians have considered carrying out those studies as
necessary, i.e. preparing the ground for the discussions of the issues
dealing with the fundamentals of religion, especially creation and
resurrection (mabda’ and ma’ad). Thus, a number of issues, which
used to be the exclusive domain of philosophy, had become part and parcel of
the science of scholastic theology, hence the spanning of topics between
philosophy and kalaam (speculative theology). Reading speculative theology
books, especially those written in the seventh century of the Islamic era
onward, you will discover that most kalaam issues were the ones
discussed by philosophers, Muslims in particular. Philosophy and kalaam
had great impact on each other. One such influence was that kalaam
had introduced new subjects into philosophy. For its part, philosophy had
widened the horizons of kalaam, in that discussing philosophical
questions within a speculative theology setting had become necessary.
Hopefully, we shall be able to expand on this subject by giving examples
later on. Rational and traditional
debate Despite the fact that the
science of kalaam is a deductive and analogous one, in the premises
and principles it espouses to reaching logical conclusions, it consists of
two parts, i.e. rational (aqli) and traditional (naqli). Reason comprises the
questions that are the exclusive preserve of reason, or intellect.
Nevertheless, if tradition is resorted to in the process, it can be
considered as an extra piece of evidence on the rational judgement. Issues
of debate of this sort include monotheism, prophethood, and some topics
relating to resurrection, where you cannot rely exclusively on tradition,
i.e. the Holy Qur’an and Prophetic tradition (sunnah). You have to
count on reason. Tradition is concerned
with issues pertaining to the fundamentals of religion that one must believe
and have faith in. However, since it is a branch of prophethood, and not
above it, it is sufficient to prove the issues by way of divine revelation
or authentic prophetic hadith (tradition), such as those questions
relating to imamate; according to Shiite doctrine, imamate is among the
fundamentals of religion. The same goes for the majority of the topics that
are relevant to the question of resurrection. Lesson two It suffices to say that
scholastic theology is a science that is concerned with studying the
fundamentals of Islamic faith. In other words, it aims to clearly segregate
the matters that relate to the fundamentals of religion, proving their
veracity with demonstrative proofs and responding to scepticism and baseless
arguments levelled against them. In books that deal with logical
and philosophical issues, there is a reference to the fact that for each and
every science there is a special subject and that what sets any science
apart from the other and makes it different is the uniqueness of the subject
it discusses. Of course, this is true. The
sciences whose topics have realistic unity fit this description. However,
there can be other sciences, whose topics are numerous, yet subjective,
provided that there is a common goal to be served, which is the reason for
such unity and subjectivity (I’itibar) Scholastic theology is of the
second type, in that the unity of its issues is not intrinsic and
qualitative but a subjective one. Thus, it is not essential to look for one
subject for the science of kalaam (scholastic theology). As for the sciences, whose
subject matter can demonstrate a fundamental unity, there will not be a
possibility of interlocking of their ingredients, i.e. interdependent
co-existence. On the other hand, for sciences whose unities are subjective,
there can be no harm if their issues intersect another science the unity of
whose subject matter is central. This is the reason for the science of
kalaam having something in common with philosophy, psychology or
sociology. Some scholars tried to come up
with a subject and a definition for the science of kalaam, like those
for philosophy. They advanced a number of theories in this regard. This is
wrong. Having a unity of subject concerns the sciences that can demonstrate
a natural unity of issues. Conversely, any science that lacks this
intrinsic unity, in other words, it is subjective, there cannot be a single
subject for it. The name There had been a debate
concerning the name given to this science, i.e. why is it called kalaam?
When was it given this name? Some attributed this name to the stature it
gives the one who is familiar with it, in that he grows in stature the more
he is involved in debate, or speech (kalaam) and in reaching rational
conclusions. Others say that the name was derived from the introductory
phrase “Debating, or speaking of, this, or that issue..” scholastic
theologians (mutakalimeen) used to start their writings or
deliberations with. A third party said that it was named the science of
kalaam because it involves “debating, talking about, or discussing”, the
issues the traditionists, or scholars of tradition, (ahlul hadith)
prefer to keep “quiet” about. A fourth group are of the opinion that the
name can be traced back to the discussion in the context of this science
about “God’s speech - kalaam”, which led to untold conflict and
killings; that is why that period was branded “the age of tribulation”, in
that people of that time overindulged in argument and polemics about
religious fundamentals and on whether God’s speech was eternal or created.
Schools of scholastic
theology As there was disagreement
between Muslims on juridical issues and the branches of religion, ending in
the setting up of different schools of thought, such as Jafari’ite, Zaidite,
Hanafite, Shafi’ite, and Hanbali’ite, there was disagreement between them
over doctrinal matters. Each group had adopted special principles. The
most important among kalaam (scholastic theology) schools of thought
are Shiite, Mu’atazilite, Ash’arite, and Murji’ite. At this juncture, a question,
tinged with regret, may be posed about the disunity of Muslims over
juridical and scholastic theology issues. Their differences in kalaam
have given rise to their disunity in Islamic thought. Their differences
over juridical matters have deprived them of the ability to show a united
front in action. Although posing the question
and expressing regret are legitimate, yet the attention must be drawn to
these two points: 1. The differences between
Muslims over these issues are not so acute that they may shake the
foundations of their doctrinal unity and joint programmes. The things they
have in common are so many that they render the issues they disagree over
insignificant. 2. Ideological and theoretical
differences in a society that still demonstrate common ideological
fundamentals are inevitable. So long as the differences stem from the same
premises and principles and are a result of the different approaches to
deduction, without compromising the main objects and aims, such differences
are beneficial, in that they enhance research and scholarship. However,
should these differences turn into entrenched positions, bigotry, and
irrational inclinations, and the individual effort becomes obsessed with
degrading others, without a real attempt to reform the approach, it would
lead to disastrous results. The Shia (Shi’ite) school of thought makes it
obligatory on the mukallaf [compos mentis: The person obligated to
observe the precepts of religion] to follow a living jurist (mujtahid). For
their part, the jurists must exert themselves, through scholarship, to
arrive at independent judgements, being vigilant as not to fall under the
sway of the legal opinions of bygone generations of jurists and great
personas. This ijtihad [lit. exertion: the process of arriving at
judgements on points of religious law, using reason and the principles of
jurisprudence “usul al-fiqh”] and independent thinking would inevitably
cause difference in opinion. However, this particular issue is responsible
for giving the Shia jurisprudence the extra edge, survival, and
continuity. In its general outlines, difference is not a bad thing. What is
condemnable is that difference resulting from ill intentions and evil
ulterior motives of those who seek to sow discord among Muslims. Questions
such as exploring the history of Islamic thought and the differences that
came to the fore as a result of ill intentions and prejudice, the
differences of opinion that emanated from rational thinking, and whether or
not we should consider all issues of kalaam as fundamental and
juridical issues as peripheral are outside the scope of these
lessons. Before starting to discuss the schools of kalaam, we have to
allude to the fact that a group of Muslim scholars were diametrically
opposed to embarking on kalaam or rational study in the questions of
fundamentals of religion. They branded this type of scholarship an
impermissible deed and a heresy, or innovation (bida’a). This group
is known as “ahlul hadith”, or the proponents (scholars) of
hadith (tradition). On top of the list of outstanding scholars of this
group was Ahmed bin Hanbal [d.245/833], the founder of the Hambalite Sunni
juridical school of thought. The Hanbalites are archenemies of any sort of
kalaam, be it Mu’tazilite or Asha’rite, let alone Shiite. They are
also known for their contraposition on philosophy and logic. The Hanbalite,
Ibn Taymiyyah [d.728/1327], the well-known jurist passed a fatwa
(edict) forbidding the involvement in scholastic theology (kalaam)
and logic (mantiq). Jalaluddin as-Suyuti, another member of ahlul
hadith wrote a book entitled, “Sawn al-Mantiq wal
kalaam an al-Mantiq wal kalaam”, i.e. the “preservation of logic and
speech from the encroachments of the sciences of logic and scholastic
theology”. Malik bin Anas [d.179/795], the founder of the Malikite School
of Thought, did not license any research into doctrinal issues. As we have
already mentioned, the most important schools of scholastic theology are the
Shiite, Mu’atazilite, Ash’arite, and Murji’ite. Some scholars considered
the Kahrijite, and the Ismaelite among the schools of Islamic scholastic
theology. However, we do not consider them as such. The Kahrijites have
espoused a special brand of beliefs in the fundamentals of religion. Maybe,
they were the first ones to do so. They have talked about some beliefs in
the context of imamate, deeming those who reject it as fasiq
(godless), whom they have branded unbeliever. Yet, (a) they did not
establish an ideological school capable of deducing legal opinion; in other
words, they did not set up an ideological system in the world of Islam; and
(b) in our opinion, as Shia Muslims, their deviant ideological opinions have
reached a proportion that they are considered outside the pale of Islam.
However, this has made things palatable, in that the Khrijites have almost
died out, except for a tolerant faction of them, i.e. the Abadhi’ites. The
survival of the group is attributed to the broad-mindedness of its
members. As for the Batinites (secretive), i.e. the Ismaelites, they
have introduced so many unsavoury innovations into Islamic thought that it
can be said that they left Islam in a state of topsy-turvy. For this
reason, Muslims are not prepared to consider them as one of them any more.
Some forty years ago, the Group for Rapprochement between Islamic Schools
of Thought was established in Cairo, Egypt. The founding fathers were
Twelver and Zaidite Shia, Hanafi’ites, Shafi’ites, Malikites, and Hanbalites.
The Ismaelites tried very hard to be represented, but all Muslims gave them
the cold shoulder. However, despite their apparent deviation from the right
path, the Ismaelites, unlike the Kharijites – who did not have a distinct
school of thought, have a school of thought, featuring scholastic theology
and philosophy. Over the ages, famous intellectuals had emerged from their
ranks, leaving behind an ideological heritage. Of late, the orientalists
have shown keen interest in their opinions and books. Among the towering
figures of the Ismaelites is Nassir Khisro al-Alawi, the Farsi famous poet
(d. 841 H.). His known books are, Jami’ul Hukmain (the Compendium of the
Two Rules), Wajhuddin (the Face of Religion), and Khawan (sic) Ikhwan (the
Brothers). Abu Hatim ar-Razi (d. 332 H.), the author of A’alamun Nubbuwwah
(The Beacons of Prophethood), is another great Ismaelite figure. Another
one is Abu Ya’qoub as-Sajistani (d. circa second half of the fourth Hijri
century), the author of Kashful Mahjoub (Unveiling the Concealed); the Farsi
translation of this book was printed some ten years ago. Also, among other
famous personalities of the Ismaelites is Hamiduddin al-Kirmani, the student
of Abu Ya’qoub as-Sajistani. He was a prolific writer on the tenets of the
Ismaelites. Abu Hanifa an-Nu’man bin Tahbit, known as Judge Nu’man and
widely known as well by Abu Hanifa ash-Shii, i.e. the Ismaeli Shiite, [to
differentiate him from the founder of the Sunni School of Thought, the
Hanifi’ite]. He undertook credible and good research in jurisprudence
and hadith. His book, Da’a’imul Islam (the Pillars of Islam) is in
circulation. Lesson three We embark on this study into
the Mua’tazilites for a reason, which we will discuss later. This group came into being
towards the end of the first century of the Islamic era, or at the turn of
the second century. Naturally, during this period, kalaam, or
scholastic theology, had already developed into a fully-fledged science. At the outset, we list down the
Mua’tazilites’ distinctive systems of belief. We will then make reference
to their famous personalities, stating some outstanding dates in their
calendar, and ending with the process of change their doctrines had gone
through before they took their final shape. The issues the Mu’tazilites had
discussed were diverse, in that they were not only interested in purely
religious beliefs, which should be upheld from their perspective. Any thing
that has a bearing on the religious, they did not hesitate to embark on
discussing. Thus, issues of philosophical, social, humanitarian, and
environmental dimensions were discussed. However, according to them, these
issues have a relationship with issues of faith and conviction. They
believe that discussing the latter was not going to come true unless the
former subjects were discussed. The Mu’tazilites hold five
tenets, they consider fundamental to their core belief: 1. Monotheism, i.e. in Essence
and Attributes. 2. Justice, i.e. God is Just
and is incapable of doing injustice. 3. Promise and threat, i.e. God
has promised those who obeyed Him with reward. By the same token, He has
threatened those who disobeyed Him with punishment. And since the promised
reward will not be revoked, so will the threat of punishment. However,
forgiveness is feasible only with man’s repentance. Forgiveness will not be
granted without it. 4. The middle way, i.e. the
fasiq (godless), i.e. the person who has committed a cardinal sin, such
as consuming alcohol, adultery, or lying, is neither a believer nor an
unbeliever. That is, they are neither here nor there; in other words, half
way between belief and unbelief. 5. Enjoining what is good and
forbidding what is evil; the Mu’tazilites argue that the way to know what is
good and what is evil is not confined to sharia law, in that
independent reasoning is capable of recognizing good and evil. Furthermore,
they maintain that upholding this duty does not necessarily require the
existence of an Imam, or leader, since it is the duty of all Muslims to
uphold it. And yet, they also recognize that some aspects of this duty are
the prerogatives of the leaders of Muslims, such as executing the Islamic
penal code, preserving the integrity of Muslim territories, and other
government affairs. Mu’tazilite theologians
discussed those fundamental tenets in detail, in works, such as al Usul
al-Khamsa (the Five Fundamentals) by Judge Abdul Jabbar al-Mu’tazili,
who was a contemporaneous to Sahib bin Abbad and as-Sayyid al-Murtadha
Allamul Huda. As is evident, monotheism and
justice are the only tenets that can be considered as those of
belief/faith. As for the remaining three fundamentals, they are distinctly
Mu’atazilite. Even “Justice”, which is a religious necessity, as is evident
in the Qur’an, being one of the five fundamentals of religion, has been
considered as one of their five tenets, because they deem it among the
features of their school of thought. Otherwise, it is not different from
the Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence that are among the necessities of
religion and its beliefs. According to the Shia School of
Thought, Justice is one of the five fundamentals of religion. At this
point, one may pose a question as to the uniqueness of this fundamental that
made it one of the five fundamentals. That is, as God is Just, He is
Omniscient, Living, Hearing, Seeing, and Omnipotent. Man has to believe in
all those Attributes. So, why was Justice singled out with distinction
above the rest? The answer to this question is
that Justice does not have any merit over and above any other Attributes.
As for Shia theologians, they have made it one of the five fundamentals of
the faith, whereas the Ash’arites, who constitute the majority of Sunnis,
denied it, unlike the other Attributes, such as Omniscience, Life, and Will. Accordingly, believing in
Justice is one of the characteristics of Shia beliefs, as is the case with
the Mu’tazilites. Therefore, the five tenets are
the main features of the Mu’tazilite School of Thought, despite the fact
that not all their beliefs are reflected in those five tenets, for they put
forward and discussed many subjects relating to divinity, natural sciences,
sociology, and the humanities. Monotheism Monoteism is of different
orders and categories. These include Unity of the Essence (Tawheed
thati), Unity of the Attributes (Tawheed sifati), Unity of the
Actions (Tawheed afa’ali), Unity of worship (Tawheed ibadi). Unity of the Essence
means that the Essence of God is one, none is like Him and no similitude can
apply to Him. Everything else is created by Him and thus lower than Him in
status and perfection; rather, it cannot be compared to Him. The Qur’anic
verses, “None is like Him” and “And there is none like
unto Him” testify to this. Unity of the Attributes
means that God’s Attributes, such as knowledge, power, life, will,
perception, hearing, and vision are not distinct from His nature. In other
words, any of these Attributes could qualify for His Essence. Unity of the Actions
means that all actions, including those of man, are commissioned with the
will of God. Unity of worship means
that there is no one besides God who is worthy of worship. Worshipping
others amounts to polytheism (shirk) and thus causes estrangement
from the domain of Islamic monotheism. Exclusively worshipping the One
and Only God is different from other categories, in that the other three
relate to God, whereas Unity of worship relates to man. In other words, upholding (a)
the integrity of His Essence, rendering it devoid of any peer or similitude,
(b) the unity of His Attributes, and (c) the Unity of the Actions, are
considered His exclusive preserve. As for the unity of worship, it means
that one should worship the One and Only God. And yet, unity of worship can
still be considered of His own affairs, in that it involves calling no
associates with Him and that He is worthy of worship, i.e. being the True
and Only God that should be worshiped; the phrase, “There is no god but
God” consists of all classes of monotheism. Naturally, it suggests
unity of worship. Unity of the Essence and Unity
of worship are the two ancient parts of fundamentals of belief in Islam.
For any Muslim to experience any mix-up in these two parts, he would not be
deemed Muslim. That is why Muslims are unanimous in upholding these two
fundamentals. However, the Wahhabi sect,
founded by Mohammad bin Abdul Wahhab, a follower of Ibn Taymiyyah al-Hanbali
ash-Shami maintains that some of Muslims’ beliefs, such as intercession, and
some of their devotional works, such as pleading with the prophets and the
good Muslims go against the grain of worship. And yet, the rest of Muslims
do not share the Wahhabis their views. Therefore, the disagreement of
the Wahhabis with the rest of Muslims does not revolve around the issue of
whether the true Unity of worship is exclusively God’s or others’, such as
the prophets. This goes without saying. Rather, the argument concentrates
on whether or not these intercessions and invocations are types of worship.
Muslim scholars refuted the Wahhabi argument with detailed counterargument
and plenty of evidence. As regards Unity of the
Attributes, there has been a rift between the Mu’tazilite and Ash’arites, in
that the latter denied it, whereas the former upheld it. Another
disagreement erupted between the two schools regarding Unity of the Actions,
but this time the other way round; the Ash’arites upheld it, whereas the
Mu’tazilites rejected it. When the Mu’tazilites call
themselves Ahlut Tawhid (the People of Monotheism), and deem
monotheism one of their five tenets, they mean Unity of the Attributes, and
not that of the Essence or of Worship – because both of them are not subject
of disagreement. The exclusion also goes for Unity of the Actions, because
they (a) deny it and (b) deal with their belief in it under the tenet of
Justice, which is the second in the order of the five fundamentals they
advocate. Both the Ash’arites and the
Mu’tazilites are diametrically opposed to one another regarding the
categories of Unity of the Attributes and Unity of the Actions. The
proponents of each school discussed their evidence in support of their
respective arguments. In a separate chapter, we shall discuss the Shia
belief regarding the two categories. Lesson four The origin of Justice
In the previous chapter, we
mentioned, in general terms, the five tenets of the Mu’tazilites. We have,
though, discussed in some detail their belief in monotheism. In this
chapter, we will be discussing the second of their tenets, i.e. Justice. It is manifestly clear that
there is not a single Islamic sect that considers Justice among the Divine
Attributes. No one has said that God is not just. However, the
Mu’tazilites differed with their arch opponents, i.e. the Ash’arites, in
interpretation. The Asha’rites advanced their argument in such a way that
the Mu’tazilites regard as equivalent to rejecting it. For their part, the
Ash’arites do not accept the charge that they are rejecters of Justice. The Mu’tazilites’ belief in
Justice is that they maintain that some actions in themselves are just while
others are in themselves unjust, such as rewarding the obedient and
punishing the sinner, which are thought to be just. So, when we say, “God
is Just”, it is because He rewards the dutiful and punishes the offender; it
is impossible that He goes contrary to that, and yet, if He does the
opposite, it would count as injustice, in which case it is impossible that
it could emanate from Him. By the same token, coercing man to commit vile
deeds or dispossessing his willpower is regarded as unfair and unjust, which
cannot emanate from God, as it is abhorrent, is not permissible, and goes
contrary to the Divine affairs. However, the Ash’arites
maintain that there is no such action as intrinsically just or unjust. And
yet, what God does is just. Supposing that He rewarded the sinner and
punished the obedient, this is the very justice. Similarly, if He took away
their willpower and made them commit that which is vile, then punished them
for it, this cannot be regarded as miscarriage of justice. Thus, the Mu’tazilites went
against the Unity of Actions, because of their reading of Justice in this
manner. Central to the Unity of Actions is that man should not commission
the action by his own hands. In other words, God is the One who creates it,
and because it is obvious that God will punish the offender and reward the
compliant, punishing the sinner, who did not sin out of his free will, would
be deemed unfair. This is how the Mu’tazilites concluded that Unity of
Actions goes contrary to the grain of Justice. Accordingly, the Mu’tazilites
maintain that man has freewill and choice. They, therefore, defended this
doctrine passionately, unlike the Ash’arites, who denied man’s freewill. The Mu’tzalites followed the
tenet of Justice - which requires that some actions are inherently just and
others are inherently unjust, and that it is entirely for reason to
arbitrate which is which - by another wide spanning tenet, i.e. that of
inherent good and repugnance of actions. Qualities like truthfulness,
trustworthiness, chastity, and piety are in themselves good, as opposed to
qualities such as lying, treachery, and vile deeds are abominations by
nature. Thus, actions, even before God passes judgement on them, one way or
the other, are capable of demonstrating their innate good or bad aspects.
This has guided the
Mu’tazilites to another tenet about man’s intellect, in that it is
independent and capable of distinguishing what is good and what is repugnant
of things. That is, irrespective of what the sharia law resolves,
man can tell good from bad. However, the Ash’arites are disinclined to
accept this argument. Nevertheless, this question has
led to a host of issues, some relate to the Divine and others to man. The
question of God’s works is one of these issues. That is, is there any
purpose behind God’s creation? The Mu’tazilites said: If there were no aim
behind God’s creation, this would amount to committing something that is
repugnant, in which case it is rationally inadmissible. How about asking
man to do what is not in his power? That is, can God ask man to do that
which he cannot do? The Mu’tazilites say that this is both repugnant and
out of the question. Is man capable of upholding unbelief? The
Mu’tazilites answer in the affirmative, in that if the believer is not
capable of becoming one and the unbeliever is not able to becoming one, the
institution of “reward and punishment” would be rendered nonsensical. The
Ash’arites take the opposite position. Monotheism Promise means the hope for
reward and threat is the risk of getting punished if you fell foul of the
Law. The Mu’tazilites argue that since God took it upon Himself to reward
the Law-abiding among His creation, as He has declared in the Holy Qur’an,
“Our Lord! Thou are He that will gather mankind together against a Day
about which there is no doubt; for Allah never fails in His promise.”
(3/9). And since there is unanimity between Muslims on this, He will not
break His promise insofar as punishment is concerned. Therefore, God will
fulfil all the threats with punishment issued to the godless and the
debauchee, unless they repent in their lifetime. Thus, repentance without
forgiveness is not possible. According to the Mu’tazilites,
this would entail withholding the threat, which can be equated with breaking
the promise of reward, i.e. if they were true, they would necessarily be
both repugnant and inconceivable. This belief of the Mu’tazilites stemmed
from the question of rational good and repugnance, which is linked to the
issue of forgiveness. The middle way The tenet of the Mu’tazilites
of the middle way came as a reaction to two beliefs, which were dominant in
the world of Islam then, i.e. unbelief/belief of the fasiq
(godless). The Kharijites were the first ones to hold that committing a
cardinal sin is akin to unbelief (kufr). As is known, the Kharijites
were catapulted on the Islamic ideological scene after the incident of
“arbitration” (tahkeem) in Siffeen war [between the then Caliph,
Imam Ali (a.s.) and Mu’awiyah, the then governor of Shaam (Syria)] in
the first half of the first century of the Islamic era, i.e. circa 37 H. It has been reported in Nahjul
Balagha (The path of eloquence) [a collection of Imam Ali’s sermons,
letters, axioms, etc.] that the Imam (a.s.) engaged them in debate and
refuted their claim with conclusive evidence. After the rule of Imam Ali (a.s.),
the Kharijites took a hostile position vis-à-vis all the rulers that came
after him. They took it upon themselves to uphold the duty of “enjoining
what is good and forbidding what is evil” to the letter; they were as well
the proponents of declaring people godless and unbelievers (at-tafseeq
wat-takfeer). And since the majority of the caliphs were
committing cardinal sins, the Kharijites branded them unbelievers. That is
why they were always on the opposite side of the policies of the ruling
establishment. In opposition to the Kharijites
there appeared another sect known by the Murji’ites (Procrastinators), or
should we say the ruling establishment established it. They teach that the
judgement of every true believer, who has been guilty of a grievous sin,
will be deferred [yurj’a, hence the name murji’a], or left in a state
of suspension, till resurrection. They also hold that disobedience with
faith does not do harm, and that, on the other hand, obedience with
infidelity would not benefit the person. The ruling establishment
benefited from the opinions of the Murji’ites, in that people were given
licence to overlook the godlessness and profligacy of the rulers. It did
not stop there; the wrongdoers among the rulers were even considered for
future places in paradise. The Murji’ites maintain, “The imam’s
(leader’s) position should not be encroached upon, even though he be a
sinner. He should be obeyed and prayer behind him [in congregation] is
technically deemed a proper one”. The Mu’tazilites teach that
whoever is guilty of grievous, or cardinal, sin is neither a believer nor an
unbeliever; he is in the middle ground between faith and unbelief. That is
why they gave it the name, “middle way, or position”. It is reported that the first
one to espouse this view was Wasil bin Ata’ [d. 130/748], student of al-Hassan
al-Basri. It is said that one day he was attending one of his teacher’s
lectures on the difference of opinion [on the question of the fasiq
(godless)] between the Kharijites and the Murji’ites. Before his
teacher gave an opinion, he intervened, saying: I believe those guilty
of cardinal sins were fasiq (godless) and not unbelievers. He then left
the place; it is also said that his teacher expelled him. Having severed
his relations with his teacher, he set up a seminary of his own and started
imparting his views. He was joined by his brother-in-law and student, Amr
bin Ubaid. This had led al-Hassan al-Basri to remark, “I’itazalana
Wasil, i.e. he left our company”. However, the wider public would say,
“They [i.e. Wasil and Amr] disagreed with the unanimous word, or
view, of the umma (Muslim community)”.
Enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong This duty [in Arabic: al amr
bil ma’rouf wan nahi anil munkar] is considered among the essentials of
Islam. Muslims are unanimous in upholding this tradition, although they may
differ as to its boundaries and stipulations. The Kharijites, for instance,
say that there are no strings attached to upholding it in all circumstances. However, some ideologues say
that it should be implemented, provided there be a good result, and also
with the proviso that carrying it out would not attract unsavoury reaction.
And yet, the Kharijites chose to differ. While others suppose that
“enjoining good, or right, and forbidding evil, or wrong” relates to one’s
conscience and tongue, the Kharijites have made it compulsory that it be
upheld, so much so that, in certain circumstances, they take to the sword to
defend it. Among those who teach that in
upholding this duty one should not go beyond verbal counselling was Ahmad
bin Hanbal [d.245/855]. At some stage during the Umayyad dynastic rule,
this view was taken on board, so much so that campaigns to root out
objectionable actions (mukaraat) were ruled impermissible.
The Mu’tazilites accepted the
parameters of this duty, without confining it to the verbal. They, however,
believe that if objectionable behaviour became widespread, or governments
turned out to be repressive and unjust, it becomes incumbent on Muslims to
uphold the duty. This view of the Mu’tazilites
goes contrary to that of Ahlul Hadith (the People of the tradition)
and the Sunnis, whereas it concurs with that of the Kharijite, irrespective
of the other differences between these schools of thought. Lesson five What has been discussed in the
previous two lessons relate to the core beliefs of the Mutazilite School of
Thought. However, and as we have already mentioned, they advanced many
views and opinions and defended them fervently. Some of those views relate
to different disciplines, such as divinity, physics (or natural sciences),
sociology, and man. Insofar as subjects of divinity, or metaphysics, are
concerned, there are those, which involve the public aspects, and those that
deal with the intimate aspects. It goes without saying that, in common with
other speculative theologians, the Mu’tazilites have aimed to deal with the
latter, which revolve around the core of religious beliefs. As regards the
discussion on public affairs, it is deemed as a prelude to the wider issues
of discussing metaphysics. The same applies to natural sciences. That is,
should theologians embark on any question in the domain of physics, they do
so as a lead up to proving a religious belief or solving a problem relating
to it. We give below a summary of those views, starting with metaphysics. The Divine Unity of the Attributes. Justice. The Word, or speech, of God;
is it created, i.e. is the Word a characteristic of the Action, and not of
the Essence? God’s actions have aims, i.e.
each and every action that emanates from God has a purpose and serves an
interest. Forgiveness without
repentance is not possible. This is one of the fundamentals, i.e. promise
and threat. Asking man to do more than
that in his power is inconceivable. Man’s actions are not created
by God in any form. God’s will has no say in man’s own actions. The universe has been brought
into existence (haadith). This view is diametrically opposed to
what philosophers hold. Physically seeing God,
whether in this world or the hereafter, is impossible. Natural science
The body is composed of
indivisible atoms. Smell is caused by atoms,
travelling in the atmosphere. Flavour is nothing but
particles that influence the taste of man. Light consists of particles
travelling in the atmosphere. Interference of bodies is not
inconceivable. This view is espoused by some Mu’tazilites. Impulsive motion is not
inconceivable. This view too is held by some Mu’taziltes. Man Man has freewill and choice
and is not coerced. This idea relates to the idea of creation of actions
and the issue of Divine Justice. Power, i.e. man has the power
to decide, before embarking on any activity, to go ahead with it or
abandon it. The believer is capable of
turning into an unbeliever and vice versa. The godless is neither a
believer nor an unbeliever. Reason, or intellect, is
capable of distinguishing certain matters independent of any prior
guidance from the sharia Law. When tradition goes contrary
to reason, the latter should take precedence over tradition. The Holy Qur’an can be
interpreted by way of intellection. Social and political issues
It is compulsory to uphold
the duty of enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil, even if it
requires taking to fighting with the sword. The succession to power of
the Guided Caliphs in the order it took place is sound. Ali was more superior to
those who preceded him to power. This view, however, is espoused by some
Mu’tazilites. The majority of them, except Wasil bin Ata’, were of the
opinion that Abu Bakr was more superior. However, later generations
maintain that Ali was more superior. It is permissible to
criticise the Companions [of the Prophet (s.a.w.)], study and
analyse their works. Undertaking a comparative
study of the political programmes of both [the Guided Caliphs] Omar and
Ali. The above list is by no means
exhaustive. In some of those issues, the Mu’tazilite views agree with those
of the Ash’arites, the philosophers, the Shiites, the Kharijites and the
Murj’ites. It is to be noted, though, that
the Mu’tazilites had never fallen under the influence of Greek thought, so
much so that they had never espoused any of its philosophical heritage that
was in vogue at the pinnacle of the Mu’tazilite ideological acumen. They
even went further in writing books, refuting the claims of philosophers.
The struggle between speculative theologians (mutakalimeen) and
philosophers benefited both the camps, in that the gulf between the two
rivals was made very much narrower, in spite of the fact that there remained
some issues, on which the two sides chose to differ. The process of change and
history Naturally, these issues did not
come to the fore at one go and were not advanced by a single person or a
particular group. They were propagated by several vanguards and espoused
and developed steadily by others through the passage of time. Among those contentious issues
was the question of compulsion and empowerment, or delegation, (jabr
and tafweedh), which was the oldest. The Mu’tazilites adopted the
principle of delegation. The Holy Qur’an discussed this question in many
passages; this might have given rise to mind provoking exercises. On the one hand, the Holy
Qur’an states unequivocally that man has freewill and choice in whatever
actions he takes and in his general conduct, i.e. he is not coerced to do
anything he is not willing to do. And yet, there are many
Qur’anic passages that state that everything is subjected to the Will of
God. This is how the
misunderstanding has happened, as those two sets of Qur’anic verses look
seemingly contradictory. Therefore, some took to interpreting the first set
to conclude that man has freewill over his actions. Others chose to side
with the second set of verses, i.e. those concerning God’s will and decree
and destiny (qadha and qadar), deducing that everything is in
the hands of the Divine. However, there is a third
group, who maintain that there is no contradiction between the two sets of
verses. This subject had been
extensively discussed in Imam Ali’s words and sermons. However, debating
the subject was synonymous with the emergence of Islam as a force to be
reckoned with. On the other hand, Muslims taking sides on, and splitting
into factions over, this issue came into being during the second half of the
first century of the Islamic era. It is said that the idea of
man’s freewill was first put forward by Ghelan ad-Dimashqi and Ma’bad
aj-Juhni [during the Umayyad rule]. The Umayyad wanted to disseminate the
ideology of compulsion (jabr) among the wider general public for
their political ends. Under the slogan, “We believe in divine decree (qadha’),
whether good or bad”, they used to justify their unjust and imposed
rule. For this reason they persecuted the proponents of the doctrine of
man’s freewill and freedom. Similarly, they executed both Ghelan and Ma’bad.
The followers of this school were called the Qadri’ites [i.e. the believers
in man’s freewill and choice]. As for the issue of fisq
(godlessness), it was debated even before the question of compulsion and
freewill. Its first exponents were the Kharijites, during the rule of Imam
Ali (a.s.). However, they did not debate it in a scientific and structured
way, as was the case in the discipline of kalaam (scholastic
theology). This, though, was taken up by the Mu’tazilites, who developed
it, using kalaam techniques. The result was the espousal of “the
middle way, or position”, [i.e. the godless is neither a believer nor an
unbeliever; he is half way between the two]. Discussing the question of
decree and destiny had led to a host of other issues. Divine Justice,
rational good and repugnance, justifying Divine Actions by way of intents
and purposes, and the inconceivability of requiring man to do what is beyond
his power and reach, to name but a few. In the second half of the
second century of the Islamic era (Hijri), a man called al-Jahm bin
Safwan [d.127/745] circulated new ideas concerning the Attributes of the
Divine. The historians of sects and factions (milel and nihel)
allege that Unity of the Attributes, i.e. God’s Attributes are His very
Essence, which the Mu’tazilites deem the bedrock of Monotheism, as well as
the question of the dissimilarity between God and His creation, i.e. (tanzih)
[the principle of elimination of “form and qualities of man” from the
conception of the Divine], was first advanced by al- Jahm bin Safwan; his
followers were later known by the Jahmi’ites. In the doctrine of
empowerment (tafweedh), The Mu’tazilites followed in the footsteps of
the Qadri’ites. As regards monotheism and tanzih they chose to
follow the Jahmi’ites. As for bin Safwan himself, he was a Jabri’ite.
Thus, and as has been reported,
the Mu’tazilites, in two of their fundamental beliefs – monotheism and
justice, followed two other groups. That is, in monotheism, they adopted
what the Jahmi’ites advocate, and in justice, they emulated the Qadri’ites.
It can, therefore, be said that the Mu’tazila school of thought represents
the development of the views of the two groups into a distinct shape. The founder of this school of
theology, i.e. who turned it into a distinct sect, was Wasil bin Ata’ al-Ghazzal
[d. 130/748], who was a disciple of Al-Hassan al-Basri. He deserted his
teacher after he gave an opinion on the matter of the godless (fasiq)
before waiting for his teacher to reply and left to set up his own
seminary. That is why his disciples and the followers of his school are
called the deserters, or separatists, i.e. Mu’tazilites. However, others
are of the opinion that the name was first given to a group of people who
chose to take a neutral position vis-à-vis the wars of al Jamal and Siffen,
[which were fought during the rule of Imam Ali], such as Sa’ad bin Abi
Waqqas, Zaid bin Thabit, and Abdulla bin Omar. At a later date, when the
question of faith or unbelief of the fasiq (godless) was raised by
the Kharijites, a question which divided Muslims into two camps, a third
group took a third way, preferring to stay neutral. In other words the
approach personalities such as bin Waqqas adopted in a political matter.
This theological group espoused in an ideological issue, hence the name,
Mu’tazilite (non-aligned). The studies of Wasil bin Ata’
were confined to the issues of God’s Attributes, tafweedh (man’s
freewill), the middle way [of the godless], promise and threat, and some
other opinions on the differences of the Prophet’s Companions (Sahaaba). After his departure, Amr bin
Ubaid, his brother-in-law and leading disciple, developed his opinions.
Among other prominent teachers of this school were Abul Huthail al-Allaf (d.
235H.) and Ibrahim an-Nidham (d. 231H.). At the hands of the last two, the
science of kalaam (speculative theology) took a philosophical tone.
Abul Huthail studied the books of the philosophers and wrote critical essays
of them. An-Nidham came up with new and numerous theories in physics, among
which was the “atoms of bodies”. Among other luminaries of the
Mu’tazilites was Al-Jahidh, the famous man of letters, writer, and author of
the book, “Al-Bayan wat Tabyeen” (The Declaration and Elucidation), who
lived in the third century of the Islamic era (i.e. Hijri). The Mu’tazilites were not on
good terms with the rulers of the Umayyad dynasty. In the early days of the
Abbasid dynasty, they took a neutral position. However, al-Ma’moun [d.
256/870], the famous Abbasid Caliph took notice of their dogma and granted
them protection; this had continued during the rule of both al-Mu’tasim and
al-Wathiq, who succeeded him in the office of Caliphate. Those three
caliphs were known to be of a Mu’tazilite persuasion. In those days, kalaam
issues were hotly debated, so much so that debate travelled far and wide in
the Islamic world. The question of the Word, or Speech, of God, i.e. is it
of the domain of His Actions or His Essence? Is it created or eternal, such
as Omnipotence, Life, and Omniscience? And is the Qur’an, which is the Word
of God, created and caused or not created and eternal? The Mu’tazilites are of the
opinion that the Word of God is created and that the Qur’an is created and
caused; they went even further in declaring those who believe in the
eternity of the Qur’an as unbelievers. Others took the opposite view. Al-Ma’moun
issued an order, punishing any person who maintained that the Qur’an is
eternal. As a result many people were imprisoned and tortured. The Abbasid Caliphs al-Mu’tasim
and al-Wathinq continued the policy of their predecessor al-Ma’moun, in
cracking down on dissent. Ahmad bin Hanbal [d.245/833], the founder of the
Hanbalite School of Thought was the most famous of their prisoners. The
Caliph al-Mutawakkil turned his back to the Mu’tazilites and persecuted
them. During those testing times, a lot of blood was spilled and properties
ransacked. Muslims dub that period as “tribulation”. That onslaught by al-Mutawakkil
almost decimated the Mu’tazilites. The arena was left for Ahlus
Sunnah (The Sunnis) and Ahlul Hadith (the People of the
Tradition). Nevertheless, even during the
periods of their weakness, they managed to produce outstanding ideologists,
such as Abul Qassim al-Balkhi, also known as al-Ka’bi (d. 217 H.), Abu Ali
al-Jibba’i (d. 303 H.), his son, Abu Hashim al-Jibba’i, Judge Abdul Jabbar
al-Mu’tazili (d. 415 H.), Abul Hassan al-Khayyat, who lived at the lifetime
of as-Sahib bin Abbad, az-Zamakhshari (d. 583 H.) and Abu Ja’far al-Iskafi. Lesson six As we have already explained in
the previous lessons that the ideas that led to the emergence of the
Mutazilite School of Thought can be traced back to the second half of the
first century of the Islamic era. In an attempt to understand the
fundamentals of religion and propagating them, they advocated an approach
that was a mixture of logic and deduction. It goes without saying that the
first parameter in this approach was giving precedence to the independent
judgement of reason over any other thing. It is obvious too that the wider
general public are not concerned with reasoning and examination, considering
“practicing religion” synonymous to “worship”, and the manifest, or
exoteric, meaning of Qur’anic verses and hadiths (Prophetic
traditions), especially the latter, as a forgone conclusion. They even
believe that any reasoning or exerting effort in this regard is a kind of
rebellion against religiousness. This is particularly so, when the ruling
establishment encourages this type of thinking; more so, if some of the
clergy are proponents of such strand of ideas, and worse still if some are
pseudo-clerics. Examples of these abound. The intolerance shown, and harsh
smear campaigns waged, by the Ikhbaris [a Shia sect that depends
solely on reported tradition (Akhbar) in formulating its juridical rulings]
against the fundamentalists and the mujtahids [jurists, who depend
on reason, in addition to other tools of jurisprudence, such as the Qur’an,
and Sunna “Prophetic tradition”, in arriving at religious judgements] is
one such example. Another is the attack by some jurists and speculative
theologians on the philosophers in the Islamic world. The Mu’tazilites had made great
leaps in understanding Islam, propagating and defending it against the
Dahriyeen [proponents of the doctrine of the eternity of the world, a
materialistic, atheistic trend in medieval Islam], Jews, Christians,
Magians, Sabians, and others. They were responsible for educating scores of
propagators and sending them far and wide to promote Islam. They,
nevertheless, were threatened from within the camp of Islam at the hands of
Dhahirites, i.e. Ahlul Hadith, or Ahlus Sunna. They were
fatally stabbed in the back, so much so that they waned and eventually died
out. In the beginning, i.e. until
late in the third and early fourth centuries of the Islamic era, there were
no theology schools that were opposed to their school, as was the case much
later. All differing views were reactions to the views that were advanced
by the Mu’tazilites that boiled down to hadith and sunnah.
However, originally, the chief exponents of the
However, at the close of the
third and the turn of the fourth centuries, a new development took place on
the ideological landscape. Abul Hassan al-Ash’ari [d. 324/935] arrived at
the scene. He was a towering figure endowed with genius. He studied for
years at the hands of Judge Abdul Jabbar al-Mu’tazili. He defected to the
Sunni camp. He drew on his experience and Mu’atazilite roots and managed to
set up a distinct Sunni School of Thought, championing deduction in arriving
at the fundamental beliefs of the Sunnis. Contrary to the leaders of
Ahlul Hadith, such as Ibn Hanbal, al-Ash’ari sanctioned the use
of critical examination, deduction, and logic in the fundamentals of
religion. He substantiated his research with evidence from the Holy Qur’an
and the Sunnah (Prophetic tradition). He wrote a book in this regard
entitled, “A treatise in approving of the embarkation on kalaam
(scholastic theology)”. With the advent of the Asha’rite school, Ahlul
Hadith (the People of the tradition) were split into two groups, the
Asharites, who endorsed the involvement in kalaam, and the Hanbalites
who made the involvement in this type of theology unlawful. It is to be
noted, however, that Ibn Hanbal wrote a book, justifying the barring of
experimenting in logic and scholastic theology. It did not come at a worse time
for the Mu’tazilites, i.e. when they had already been weakened by the blows
they had suffered. Ordinary people started deserting them in droves,
especially during the events of “tribulation”, that is, when they attempted
to force their way of thinking on the people under duress, making use of
rulers who were sympathetic to and supportive of their brand of doctrine.
Among the most vexing issues was the question of “the creation of the Qur’an”.
It is well documented that the events, which were given the name,
“tribulation”, led to many deaths; and people were persecuted and made
prisoners of conscience. The people blamed the Mu’tazilites for those
events and thus became averse to their doctrines because of what they saw of
their responsibility for the mayhem. The people’s welcoming the
arrival of the new school of thought, the Asha’rite, was due to these two
reasons. After the departure of Abul Hassan al-Asha’ri, there appeared new
figures, who contributed to cementing his ideas and developing them. Among
them were Abu Bakr al-Baqillani (d. 403 H.), who was a contemporaneous of
ash-Sheikh al-Mufid, Abu Ishaq al-Isfarayeeni, Imam al-Juwaini, the teacher
of al-Ghazzali, Imam al-Ghazzali (d. 505 H, 1111 CE) himself, the author of
the book, “Ihya’ Uloomuddin – Revival of the sciences of
religion”, and [physician, philosopher, chemist and freethinker],
Imam Fakhruddin ar-Razi [c.250/864 – 313/925 or 320/932]. The Ash’arite School had
undergone gradual change, especially at the hands of al-Ghazzali, who
watered down its kalaam image, giving it a gnostic, i.e. mystic or
sufi, colour. During the time of al-Fakhr ar-Razi, it bordered on the
philosophical. However, when the time of al-Khawaja Nasiruddin at-Tusi
[the theologian, philosopher, scientist, and vizier 597/1201 – 672/1274]
came, and wrote his book, “Tajridul I’tiqad – Uncovering of
Belief”, he took the science of kalaam (speculative theology) to an
almost entirely philosophical domain. The book of this Shiite philosopher
and theologian set the agenda for all scholastic theologians, who succeeded
him, be they Ash’arite or Mutazilite. After “Tajridul
I’tiqad”, at-Tusi wrote “al-Mawaqif – The Positions” and “al-Maqasid
– The Intents”, and the annotations that went with them. In style and
approach, the last two were not different from “Tajridul I’tiqad”.
In fact, with the passage of time, the Ash’arites had become far removed
from the teachings of the founder of their school, becoming closer to the
Mu’tazilite ideology and philosophy. We give below a broad list of
the tenets of al-Ash’ari, who defended the fundamental beliefs of the
Sunnis, or more appropriately made these beliefs clearly defined, in some
measure: Abul Hassan al-Ash’ari was a
prolific writer, so much so that it is said that he wrote more than two
hundred works. Some one hundred titles of these are mentioned in the
bibliographies. It is evident, though, that most of these books had been
lost. However, the most famous of his books could be, “Maqaaltul
Islamiyyin – The Tracts of the Islamists”. Anther book is, “Alluma’
– The Brilliancy”. Al-Ash’ari’s views left an
indelible mark on the Islamic doctrinal landscape, and this is regrettable.
However, the Mu’tazilites and the philosophers wrote many books, refuting
his opinions. Many of his beliefs and views were mentioned in Ibn Sina’s
(Avicenna’s) book, “Ash-Shifa’ - The Healing, without quoting
the source, and were disproved. Not only this, some of his followers, such
as Judge al-Baqillani and Imamul Haramain al-Juwaini had revised his theory
on man’s compulsion. Although Imam Mohammad al-Ghazzali
was Ash’arite, and was instrumental in consolidating the doctrinal
principles of the Ash’arite School, yet he revamped it with new ideas. He
was responsible for bringing the science of kalaam (scholastic
theology) closer to gnosis (irfan) and Sufism. The Iranian poet
ar-Rumi, the author of the book, “al-Mathnawi” was Ash’arite,
and yet, he was more inclined to radical irfan. Because of Imam
ar-Razi’s philosophical background, he gave the Ash’arite kalaam a
new impetus and a breath of fresh air. The triumph of the Ash’arite in
the world of Islam came at a high cost. It is a victory for inflexibility,
or inertia, and prohibitive practices over freedom of thought. Although the
warring was mainly between the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites, i.e. within
the Sunni branch of Islam, yet the Shia World did not escape unscathed.
However, there were historical as well as social reasons for this victory.
Furthermore, certain political developments had a great influence on this
front. The Abbasid Caliph, al-Mutawakkil,
had played a significant part in making the Sunni School of Thought gain the
upper hand. A century later, Abul Hassan al-Ash’ari gave the School a
speculative theologian touch. It goes without saying that had al-Mutawakkil
been of the same persuasion of his predecessor, al-Ma’moun, the Mu’tazilites
would not have faced that fate. It is noteworthy that the
ascendancy of Turkic Seljuks in Iran had played a part in the triumph and
spread of the Asha’rite doctrines. The Seljuks were not people of thought
and liberty, unlike aal-Buwaih, during whose rule, Shi’ism and Mu’tazilte
ideology made a comeback. Ibnul Ameed and as-Sahib bin Abbad, among the
politicians and scholars, were anti Asha’rite. We are not trying to defend the
beliefs of the Mu’tazilites, in that we will take issue with several of
their simplistic ideas. However, one is left with no alternative but to
sing the praise of their rational methodology, which died out with their
departure from the Islamic ideological scene. As is known, a religion as
rich and as profound as Islam is in need of kalaam, which is based on
the freedom of the intellect and well founded belief and faith. The turn now is for the
discussion of kalaam (scholastic theology), as advocated by
the Shia. This science, which deals with rational judgement and logic in
the field of the fundamentals of Islamic beliefs, has a unique and excellent
place with the Shia. Above all, kalaam, in the view of the
Shia, has, on the one hand, a strong link with their reported tradition (ahaadith).
On the other hand, it meshes with their philosophy. As we have already
mentioned, kalaam, in the view of the Sunnis, is a phenomenon that
contravenes hadith and sunnah (Prophetic tradition). And yet,
according to the Shia, kalaam does not go contrary to hadith
and sunnah only, but has a special place in both of them. The secret of this is that the
traditions of the Shia, unlike those of the Sunnis, comprise a number of
hadiths that deal with logic, metaphysics, and sociology, which have
undergone critical study and examination. In the body of Sunni hadiths
these subjects do not feature a lot. Should you come across issues, such as
decree and destiny, God’s Will and His Attributes, man’s soul, and life
after death, imamate, caliphate, reckoning and the book [of good and bad
deeds], you will not find a detailed study that should go with any of
those issues. When it comes to the Shia hadiths, you will find, as a
matter of course, discussions and elucidations backed by ample evidence. It
suffices to compare the sections, pertaining to these subjects, in the six
Sunni authentic compendia of hadith with the corresponding ones in
al-Kulaini’s al-Kafi. Consequently, in the Shia
reported tradition, kalaam has been employed to mean intellection,
i.e. rational analysis. It is for this reason too that the Shia did not
split into two opposing schools, viz. Ahlul Hadith (traditionists)
and Ahlul Kalaam (speculative theologians) as had been the
case with the Sunnis. Just to recap, according to
Sunni sources, we have already mentioned that the first issue of
controversy, over one of the fundamental beliefs of Muslims, was the
question of the unbelief (kufr) of the fasiq (godless) by the
Kharijites. Second in order was the question of man’s freewill and choice,
which was advanced by Ma’bad al-Juhni and Ghelan ad-Dimashqi, contrary to
what the Umayyad rulers used to advocate. In the first half of the first
century of the Islamic era, the debate erupted about the unity of the
Attributes and the Essence, championed by al-Jahm bin Safwan. The idea of
man’s freewill, as espoused by Ma’bad and Ghelan, was taken on board by
Wasil bin Ata’ and Amr bin Obaid, co-founders of the Mu’tazilite School;
they also took up the idea of the unity of the Essence and Attributes from
al-Jahm. However, the idea of “the middle way”, regarding the unbelief or
belief of the godless was their own child. This was the beginning
of the Islamic science of kalaam. Indeed, this is one
interpretation for the emergence of religious rational discussions in Islam,
which was advocated by the orientalists and professors of Islamic thought in
the East and the West. Those people [i.e. the
orientalists] had deliberately however, overlooked the role of Imam Ali
(a.s.) in bringing these serious deductive and rational studies to the fore. It is a known fact that raising
such thought-provoking issues in the domain of Islamic thought was done by
Imam Ali in his sermons, appeals, and letters. He was the first to talk
about the Essence and the Attributes, Eternity and Transience, simplicity
and complexity, unity and multiplicity, and other profound questions, the
majority of which can be found in Nahjul Balagha (Path of
Eloquence), an anthology of Imam Ali’s words, and other authentic Shia
reports. Those discussions and studies were characterized by the spiritual,
which was completely alien to the kalaam techniques of the
Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites that were the product of the thought prevalent
in their own day and age. Sunni historians recognize that
Shia thought has been woven of a philosophical fibre. In other words, their
intellectual and rational approach is based on deduction. Shia thought is
dissimilar to the Hanbilite thought, which unequivocally reject the use of
reason and evidence in reaching conviction in religious beliefs. It is also
not like the Ash’arite thought, which takes its cue from reason and makes it
subservient to the apparent meanings of expressions per se. And it
is contrary to the Mu’tazilite thought, which unleashes the rational
tendency, because it is based on argumentation that lack substance and
proof. As a result, most of the Muslim
philosophers were of Shia persuasion. The heart of Islamic philosophy had
and is still being kept pumping by the efforts of Shia scholars who have
been imbued with this spirit by their Imams, especially the Commander of the
Faithful, Ali (a.s.). Shia philosophers did not
approach philosophical argumentation with the same methodology of kalaam,
shuttling between demonstrative wisdom (himkah burhaniyya) and
a dialectic one (hikmah jadaliyya). Rather, they succeeded in
reinforcing the fundamental beliefs of Islam, inspired by the Holy Qur’an
and the emanations of the great Imams of religion. That is why if we want
to compile a list of Shia scholastic theologians, meaning those expounders
of Islamic Shia beliefs, we will include in it a group of transmitters of
hadith and philosophers. This is so because Shia traditions (hadith)
and philosophy have served the purpose of kalaam in a better way than
the science of speculative theology (kalaam) itself. However, if it is meant those
scholars who fell under the sway of Mu’tazilite and Ash’arite are
speculative theologians, we should confine the list to a very small number.
And yet, we do not see any reason for this. Putting aside the statements of
the great Imams (a.s.) on beliefs, which are contained in their sermons,
reports, and supplications, the first among Shia scholars, who wrote a book
on this subject was Ali bin Ismael bin Maythem at-Tammar. Maythem at-Tammar
himself was a companion of Imam Ali (a.s) and was a great orator and
communicator. His grandson Ali bin Ismael lived during the lifetime of Amr
bin Obaid and Abul Huthail al-Allaf, who were among the first generation of
Mu’tazilite scholastic theologians in the first half of the second century
of the Islamic era (i.e. Hijri). Among the disciples of Imam
Ja’far as-Sadiq (a.s.) [148/765], there was a group who earned the name,
“scholastic theologians – mutakalimmeen)”, such as Hisham bin al-Hakam
[d. 198 H/812 CE], Hisham bin Salim, Humran bin A’yen, Abu Ja’far al-Ahwal,
known as Mu’min at-Taq, and Qais bin Masir. In his monumental compendium of
hadith, al-Kafi, al-Kulaini reports on a debate that took place
between this group and an opposing one, with whose results Imam as-Sadiq (a.s.)
was joyful. Those scholars were instructed
by Imam Ja’far as-Sadiq during the first half of the second century of the
Islamic era. This is a clear proof that the Imams (a.s.) not only took it
upon themselves to engage in kalaam, but brought up in their
seminaries generations of scholars in this discipline. Hisham bin al-Hakam,
for example, excelled in kalaam and not hadith or Qur’anic
commentary. Even when he was of a tender age, Imam as-Sadiq (a.s.) used to
give him a special treatment over others of his companions and students.
There is agreement between observers that he earned this special treatment
due to his outstanding scholarship in kalaam. In raising the station of
Hisham, the scholastic theologian, over the scholars of hadith and
jurisprudence, Imam as-Sadiq wanted to stress the importance and value of
doctrinal studies and give preference to kalaam over the other two
subjects. It is obvious that this type of
conduct by the Imams (a.s.) played a role in spreading kalaam and
shaping Shia rational thinking into a distinct kalaam and
philosophical school. Imam ar-Ridha (a.s.), [who
was heir apparent to the Abbasid Caliph al-Ma’moun, d. 220/833], used to
take part in the polemic sessions convened by al-Ma’moun for speculative
theologians of different schools of thought. The proceedings of those
debates have been recorded in the Shia books. As the orientalists overlooked
the ideological heritage of Imam Ali (a.s.), they did the same thing with
those historical facts that show the Imams (a.s.) sparing no effort in
initiating and promulgating rational research into doctrinal issues. And
this is both puzzling and questionable. Al-Fadhl bin Shathan an-Nashabouri,
who was a companion of the Imams ar-Ridha, al-Jawad, and al-Hadi (a.s.), was
a jurist, traditionist (hadith scholar), and scholastic theologian.
He wrote several books in kalaam. The majority of members of the
House of Banu Nawbakht were scholastic theologians. Among them were al-Fadhl
bin Abi Sahl, who was chief librarian of Baitul Hikmah (the
House of Wisdom) Library during the rule of [Abbasid Caliph Haroun]
ar-Rashid and was a reputed translator, Ishaq bin Abi Sahl, his son, Ismael,
the latter’s son, Ali and his grandson, Abu Sahl – who is known in the Shia
circles as Sheikhul Mutakalimmeen (the teacher, or master, of
speculative theologians), al-Hassan bin Mousa, the nephew of Ismael bin Ali,
and others of this family of scholarship. In the third century of the
Islamic era, there emerged another luminary, i.e. Ibn Qubba ar-Razi. In the
beginning of the fifth century of the Islamic era, a reference could be made
to Abu Ali [Ahmad] bin Miskawaih al-Hakim [d. 421/1030], [who was
a member of a distinguished group of thinkers who combined political careers
with philosophical activity] and also a famous physician and author of
the work, “Taharatul A’raaq – Purity of the Dispositions”. Shia scholastic theologians are
many. Among them is Khawaja Nasiruddin at-Tusi [597/1201 – 672/1274], a
well-known philosopher and mathematician, the author of the work, “Tajridul
I’itiqaad – Uncovering the Belief”. Allama (Scholar) al-Hilli,
a very well-known jurist, the author of annotations on Tajridul
I’itiqaad. In his book Tajridul
I’itiqaad, at-Tusi wrote an unrivalled and strong defence of kalaam,
so much so that speculative theologians, who succeeded him, be they Sunni or
Shia, followed in his footsteps. To him goes the credit of introducing
significant and qualitative change into philosophy or wisdom (hikmah),
in that he moved it away from argumentation to demonstrative proof. In
later stages, though, this change was made complete, i.e. the break was
irreversible between the old methodology and the new one. In fact all have
become followers of wisdom of the proof (hikmah burhaniyya).
On the other hand, kalaam (scholastic theology) lost its independence
in favour of philosophy. After at-Tusi, Shia
philosophers used to discuss kalaam issues in a philosophical manner
and context and achieved success in this regard more than their predecessors
among scholastic theologians (mutakalimmeen). Sadrul Muta’aliheen
and Allama Sabzwari, who were not considered among mutakalimmeen,
reached the pinnacle of eloquence and influence in this discipline. As a matter of fact, if we
consult the pristine sources of Islam, such as the Qur’an, Nahjul Balagha
(Peak of Eloquence) and the traditions of the Prophet and his Pure Progeny,
we would find out that this approach is closer to these sources than the
first, [i.e. kalaam methodology]. In this lesson we shall discuss
in brief some Shia theories in the context of kalaam, of the sort
that are common between Muslim scholastic theologians. During the discussion of the
Mu’tazilte School, we have already mentioned that they maintain that their
beliefs are based on five fundamentals, i.e. monotheism, justice, promise
and threat, the middle position and enjoining what is good and forbidding
what is evil. We have also said that what distinguishes these fundamentals
from other ones they uphold is the fact that they are unique to them, and
thus set them apart from other schools of thought. We should, therefore,
not be deluded that they represent the fundamentals of their faith and the
rest represent the branches. Similarly, Shia scholars, and
not their Imams (a.s.), stated the five fundamentals of Shiism, namely,
monotheism, justice, prophethood, imamate, and resurrection. It is widely recognized that
these are the fundamentals of religion and what comes next is of the
branches. In this respect, a question begs for an answer, i.e. if what is
meant by the fundamentals of religion are those that are sufficient to be
upheld by man in order to be Muslim, then would believing in monotheism and
prophethood alone suffice? What verifies this is the implication of the
testimony of faith (ash-Shahadatain), [i.e. the two-part
statement of: I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, and that
Mohammad is the Messenger of Allah]. The second part of this
declaration of faith relates to the prophethood of our master Mohammad (s.a.w.),
the Seal of Prophets, in particular. As regards the prophethood of the
other prophets, it is outside the remit of the declaration of faith. And
yet, the reality is that what constitutes part of the fundamentals of
religion and thereby warrant believing in is the prophethood of all God’s
prophets. However, if fundamentals of
religion imply, from an Islamic perspective, those ones that are of belief
and faith, to the exclusion of practical acts of worship, there remain other
matters that merit believing in, such as the angels: “The Messenger believed in
what had been revealed to him from his Lord, as do the men of faith, each
one (of them) believed in Allah, His angels, His books, and His
Messengers..” (2/285) Again, what sets the Divine
Attribute of Justice apart from the other Attributes, such as Omniscience,
Omnipotence, Life, Hearing, etc. to warrant a place among other articles of
faith? If believing in God’s Attributes is fundamental, it then follows
that one has to believe in all the Attributes. If it is not the case, no
other Attribute should be left out. The crux of the matter is that
the reasons for choosing these fundamentals are that they are regarded as
fundamentals worthy of advocating in the view of Islam. On the other hand,
they represent one of the distinct features of the [Shia] School of
Thought. However, Islam has validated the fundamentals of monotheism,
justice, and prophethood, and thus upholding them is considered one of
Islam’s goals. As for the fundamental of justice, it is distinctively Shia. That is, although Justice is
not different from the other Attributes, nor is it one of the objectives of
the faith, yet it represents the Shia’s special vision of Islam. With Shia, two features
characterize Justice, in that it falls within the domain of the articles of
the faith and clearly defines the boundaries of their distinctive School of
Thought. Going back to the belief in the
angels, which is predetermined in the Holy Qur’an, why did it not feature
among the five fundamentals? The answer to this question is that those five
fundamentals of belief fall within the objectives of Islam, in that the
Prophet (s.a.w.) called on people to embrace them and that his noble mission
was contingent on this belief. As for believing in the angels and all
necessities of religion, such as prayer and fast, they are not among the
goals of the Prophetic Message. Nevertheless, they go hand in hand with
it. In other words, this belief is deemed a prerequisite to believing in
prophethood, and not among its aims. Should we consider the
fundamental of Imamate from social and political perspectives, i.e. power
and leadership, it is like Justice, i.e. it does not come under the umbrella
of matters of faith. However, if we view it in moral terms, where the Imam
is dubbed as “Hujjat Ullah – the Proof of God” and “Khalifat
Ullah – the Representative, or Caliph, of God”, and the moral
relationship between every Muslim and sensible men at all times are
considered a forgone conclusion, Imamate would become part of the articles
of faith. Now, we give below kalaam
doctrines relating to the Shia, in addition to the five
fundamentals: 1. Monotheism,
which is one of the five fundamentals endorsed by both the Mu’tazilites and
the Ash’arites. It is worth noting that the monotheism in which the
Mutazilites believe, and which is unique to their School, is the Unity of
the Attributes that the Ash’arites rejected. As for the type of monotheism
in which the Ash’arites believe, it is the Unity of Actions, which the
Mu’tazilites refuted. We have already mentioned that
there is unanimity on both Unity of the Essence and Unity of worship, and
thus they do not feature in this discussion. In addition to Unity of the
Essence and Unity of worship, the brand of monotheism to which the Shia
subscribe is the one, which consists of Unity of the Attributes and Unity of
the Actions. However, with them, Unity of the Attributes is different from
that advocated by the Mu’tazilites. Similarly, their type of belief in the
Unity of Actions is unlike that upheld by the Ash’arites. According to the Mu’tazilites,
Unity of the Attributes means that the Divine Essence is devoid of any
Attribute. With the Shia, Unity of the Attributes means that the Attributes
are the very Essence, i.e. they are indivisible. For more details, you can
consult the Shia works of philosophy and kalaam (scholastic
theology). As held by the Shia, Unity of
the Actions is different from that espoused by the Ash’arites, as they deny
the influence of any being, apart from God, in that they say that the
Originator of acts of worship is God, and that man is not capable of
commissioning his own actions and embarking on them. This type of belief
entails pure compulsion (jabr). However, it has been disproved with
sufficient evidence. Unity of actions, as advocated by the Shia, means
that the law of causality is original. That is, each and every effect,
which is dependent on a cause that is close to it, is simultaneously
existential by the Absolute Truth (Thatul Haqq), [i.e.
God]. The two are symmetrical not asymmetrical (or contradictory). 2. Justice:
Both the Shia and the Mu’tazilites agree on the fundamental of Justice.
This means that God emanates, is merciful, gracious and causes affliction in
accordance with intrinsic merits. The world of beings (creation), which is
contingent upon emanation (faydh), mercy, affliction, grace, reward
and punishment, has been based on a meticulous system. The Asha’rite deny
this fundamental and the system that goes with it. They maintain that
upholding Justice, in this sense, entails the infringement upon the
Thatul Haqq, or God, and this, they add, goes against the grain
of Him being the All-poweful (Qahiryya mutlaqah).
3. Freewill and choice:
The Shia’s belief in this precept is more or less similar to that espoused
by the Mu’tazilites. According to the latter, freewill is akin to
tafweedh (delegation, or empowerment), i.e. man is left to his own
devices, that is, independent of the Divine Will. Obviously, this, as we
have already made clear, is impossible. With the Shia, freewill means
that God created man with freewill. However, in his existence and other
affairs – the domain of actions included, man, as is the case with the other
creation, is dependent upon the Thatul Haqq, drawing on His
Will and Providence. Accordingly, freewill with the
Shia is a middle position between the compulsion of the Ash’arites and the
empowerment of the Mu’tzilites. This belief is contained in a famous
hadith related from the Imams (a.s.), “It is neither jabr
(compulsion) nor tafweedh (delegation), but a position between the two”.
This tenet is a branch of the fundamental of Justice. 4. Inherent good and
repugnance: The Mu’tazilites are of the opinion that actions, in
themselves, may be good or bad (repugnant). Justice, for instance, is good
in itself, whereas injustice is repugnant in itself. Thus, a sensible
person is the one who embarks on actions that are good and keeps away from
those that are repugnant. And since God is Wise, His wisdom necessitates
that He commissions actions that are good; He is incapable of doing bad
things. Therefore, the requirements of good/repugnant things (actions) are
something and God’s Wisdom is something else. That is why it is said that
it is incumbent on God to carry out certain actions, whereas He is incapable
of doing some other things that are repugnant. The Ash’arites are
diametrically opposed to this idea, in that they reject the intrinsic
goodness or repugnance of things; they also reject what is incumbent and not
so on God. Some Shia theologians were
influenced by the Mu’tazilite line of thinking and accepted their argument.
Others got bogged down with the intricacies of thought, and although
accepted the case for inherent goodness and repugnance of things, yet they
did not consider it applicable to the Divine. 5. Graciousness and opting
for what is in the best interest of man: The Ash’arites and the
Mu’tazilites engaged one another in debate about God’s Grace, meaning that
He always opts for what is in the best interest of man (intikhabul
aslah). That is, does this system have prevalence in the universe? The
Mu’tazilites maintain that Grace (lutf), as an obligation or duty
[towards man], is incumbent on God, whereas the Ash’arites reject this
assertion. It goes without saying that the
principle of Graciousness, or Kindness, (lutf) branches out from the
two fundamentals of Justice and rational good and repugnant (alhusn
wal qubh al ‘aqliyyain). Some Shia scholastic
theologians took this principle on board, and yet dismissed the idea of “God
is obligated to be gracious to His creation” as manifestly wrong. They also
have discussions about the claim, “God always opts for what is in the best
interest of man”, which we cannot dwell on in this study. 6. Originality of the
intellect, its independence and authoritativeness: The Shia have said
that the human mind is imaginative, authoritative and independent more so
than the Mu’tazilites. In the reports from the Infallibles (a.s.), there
are many references to the intellect being described as the messenger within
as opposed to the Prophet (s.a.w.) being the manifest messenger. In Shia
jurisprudence, reason, or intellect, is one of the four principles, or
tools, of deducing religious rulings. 7. The aim behind God’s
Actions: The Ash’arites deny this principle. They argue that “intents
and purposes” are the exclusive preserve of man, or similar creations.
Allah is far above (munazzah) these things, because, they hasten to
add that, if it is like this, God would appear as though He were coerced to
do such actions. The Shia subscribe to this
Mu’tazilite doctrine, and yet they differentiate between the objective of
the action and the intent of the doer. What is inconceivable is that God
becomes an objective in Himself in His Actions. As for the objective that
relates to the created, it does not detract, in any way, from the loftiness
of [God’s] Essence, its Perfection, and Independence. 8. Bada’,
or change of mind, of the Divine Action is acceptable: As it is acceptable
for God to abrogate the laws, it is acceptable for Him to change His Mind. [However, when the word bada’
is used in relation to God, it means to express. That is, there are certain
commandments, which come into force according to expediency for the time
being only and thereafter the same are abrogated or some new commandments
take their place. When the word bada’ is used in relation to man, it is
said that after taking a decision to do something, he decides to abandon
it. This change of mind is due to man’s inability to understand as to what
is good for him or may be it is due to his repenting of his past actions.
Bada’, in this sense is impossible in the case of God because He is free
from ignorance and defect. Thus, the Shia do not attribute this meaning of
bada to God]. For further reading on this
topic, you may consult the books of philosophy, such as the work, “Kitabul
Asfar al-Arba’a – The Four-volume Book”, by Sadrul Mata’aliheen. 9. Seeing God: The
Mu’tazilites vehemently deny this question. They believe that man reaches
the stage of believing in God per se. And this is a matter
for man’s conscience and intellect, which are the only two paths that lead
to certitude in the existence of God, and the latter is the highest point of
faith. God cannot be physically seen in any manner. The proof on this is
this Qur’anic verse: “No vision can grasp Him,
but His grasp is over all vision; He is subtle well-aware”.
(6/103). As regards the Ash’arites, they
are adamant that God can be seen, but only on the Day of Judgement. Their
proof on this is contained in some reports and Qur’anic verses, such as
these ones: “Some faces, that Day, will
beam (in brightness and beauty); - Looking towards their Lord..”
(75/22-23). As for the Shia, they maintain
that it is absolutely impossible to see God by way of physical eyesight,
neither in this world nor in the next. They further argue that the highest
point of faith is not achieved only through rational and conscious
conviction. Rational certitude is the knowledge of certainty (ilmul
yaqeen); above it in order is conscious certainty (al
yaqeenul qalbi), which is the very, or absolute, certitude (ainul
yaqeen); that is, perceiving God by heart. God Almighty cannot be
seen by physical vision; rather by the heart. Imam Ali (a.s.) was asked,
“Did you see your Lord? He replied: I do not worship a Lord that I cannot
see. Neither eyes nor vision can see Him. The hearts see Him by virtue of
the certainties of faith”. Some Imams (a.s.) were asked, “Did the
Messenger of God see his Lord in his ascension to the seventh heaven (Mi’raaj)?
They answered: Not with the eye but by the heart”. The experts attribute
this tenet to the Shia. 10. The belief of the
godless: In this issue, which has already been repeated on a number of
occasions in this study, the Shia agree with the opinion of the Ash’arites
on it, unlike the Kharijites who maintain that the godless is deemed
unbeliever (kafir) and the Mu’tazilites who came up with the idea of
“the middle position”. 11. The infallibility of
the Prophets and the Imams: Among the beliefs of the Shia, which are
distinctly Shia, is their belief that the Prophets and the Imams are
infallible, i.e. they are incapable of committing any vile deed, be it
serious or petty. 12. Forgiveness and
intercession: The Shia disagree with the Mu’tazilites in their rigid
belief that if the wrongdoer dies without repenting for his misdeeds, he is
denied forgiveness and intercession. The Mu’tazilites are also at odds with
the Ash’arites as regards rand
Dar Al-Hadi Publications
London, U.K.
Thul Hijja, 1423 H. (February 2003)
attempts to answer the questions on the subject as well. As such, questions
like what is exactly the science of kalaam? What is it trying to achieve?
What does it deal with? Why is it called by this name? And how did it come
into existence? are questions that the booklet will attempt to examine.
Scholastic Theology
Scholastic theology, a
definition
The Mu’tazilites (1)
The Mu’tazilites (2)
The Mu’tazilites (3)
The Ash’arites
The Shia (1)
The Shia (2)